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There Empirical Differences?” 
by 
Lúcio Vinhas de Souza1 
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and 
ECARES, Free University of Brussels 
 
 
Abstract: Here the author empirically estimates if the different monetary and exchange rate 
frameworks observed in the Accession Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the 
Baltics do yield different outcomes in terms of level and variance of a set of nominal and real 
variables. The author follows and extends the methodology developed by Kuttner and Posen 
(2001), who perform a combined analysis of the individual effects of exchange rate regimes, 
central bank independence and announced targets in nominal variables, for a large set of 
developed and developing countries, and estimate that a setup that combines a free float, an 
independent monetary authority and inflation targeting yields an outcome that mimics the 
price stabilization advantages of a hard peg without its drawbacks in terms of extreme 
volatility. This sample of countries, not covered by the Kuttner and Posen study, supports 
their conclusions, for both nominal and real variables, testing for both the individual and 
combined effects of the frameworks, indicating that a flexible exchange rate regime, coupled 
with a independent monetary authority and inflation targeting, would be Pareto-improving 
when compared to harder regimes. 
 
 
JEL Codes: E5, P2. 
 
Keywords: monetary authority independence, inflation targeting, exchange rate regimes, EU 
Enlargement. 
 
 
                                                           
1Tinbergen Institute, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Burgemeester Oudlaan, nº 50, 3062 PA, Rotterdam, The 
Netherlands. Tel: (00) (31) (19) 408-8945. Fax: (00) (31) (10) 408-9031. Email: desouza@few.eur.nl. Website: 
http://www2.tinbergen.nl/~phare/Partners/Souza.html. The views expressed here are exclusively those of the 
author and do not necessarily represent those of the Bank of Estonia. On the other hand, as usual, all remaining 
mistakes are my exclusive responsibility. I thank the valuable comments made by Casper de Vries at the Erasmus 
University, and the ones made by Urmas Sepp, Ülo Kaasik, Martti Randveer, Rasmus Pikkani, Sinimaaria Ranki, 
Olivier Basdevant and Andres Vesilind in several seminars held during my stay at the Bank of Estonia, and the 
equally valuable ones made by Iikka Korhonen, Jukka Pirttiliä and Pekka Sutella during a seminar held at the Bank 
of Finland. 
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Combined Frameworks in the Accession Countries. 
 
 
 The aim of this paper is to empirically evaluate which, among the combined exchange 
rate and institutional frameworks that are available for the Accession Countries during the 
period until full Euroarea membership, would seem to deliver better results in terms of level 
and variability of such a set of variables, using a simple and transparent framework. Namely, 
the author aims to verify if the assumed superiority of harder exchange rate regimes in terms 
of nominal volatility when compared to more flexible regimes is observed when the 
combined frameworks is taken into consideration, using the framework developed by Kuttner 
and Posen (2001) for a large sample of developed and developing countries (which didn’t 
included the Accession Countries)2. 
 
Any specific type of monetary framework can be thought as of providing a 
commitment technology. In the “first best”, a stable equilibrium is achieved in an environment 
without any kind of distortions or rigidities (i.e., prices and quantities adjust freely, costlessly 
and immediately, there are no market frictions of any kind, etc), where monetary policy 
“surprises” would have no short or long run effects, since inflation expectations always equal 
their realizations.  
 
Nevertheless, if rigidities do exist (like multi-period work contracts with rigid nominal 
wages, “menu costs” or staggered prices adjustments), policy “surprises” would have potential 
short-run real effects: in such a framework, even if it is optimal for a policy maker to commit ex-
ante, it is not optimal for him to commit ex-post (for the classic reference on the so-called “time 
inconsistency problem”, see Barro and Gordon, 1983). Forward-looking agents incorporate such 
possibility in their expectations, yielding an outcome of higher inflation without even short-run 
output gains: this is the so-called “inflation bias” of a discretionary policy regime. One of the 
ways to correct this bias is through a “commitment” or a “rule” technology: the use of a credible 
monetary policy rule applied by a conservative and independent monetary authority is what is 
called a “commitment” equilibrium3 (see Rogoff, 1985). 
 
The resulting one shot-game eliminates the “inflation bias” and the “stabilization 
bias”4, thus mimicking the “second best” solution on a static context. Nevertheless, on a 
dynamic setting, both biases re-appears on Rogoff’s solution (see Walsh, 1995). 
Nevertheless, as Svensson (1997 (b)) shows, a monetary authority that acts as a combination 
of a Rogoff-type independent central bank with a non-negative (i.e., asymmetric) inflation-
targeting rule would successfully eliminate both the inflation and the stabilization bias, 
successfully mimicking, therefore, the attainable “second best” equilibrium. Therefore, the 
introduction of an explicit monetary or inflation target (inflation being generally considered a 
superior target, due to its timely production, easy understanding by the domestic economic 
agents and its full incorporation of available information in a single indicator) in the monetary 
                                                           
2This paper is based on work done during my stay as a “Visiting Researcher” at the Bank of Estonia in late 
2001, and is forthcoming at the Working Papers Series of the Bank of Estonia in 2002. 
3Of course, a currency board is just a commitment mechanism that transfers the solution of the “time 
inconsistency problem” to the policy makers of the nation that the currency is pegged to. 
4The theoretical possibility of a monetary authority to care “too little” about output stabilization (informally 
know as the “inflation nutter” scenario). The current dispute about setting an explicit non-negative inflation 
target for the Bank of Japan –which only became institutionally independent from the Japanese Ministry of 
Finance back in 1998- partially reflects such concerns, and gives them empirical relevance. Japan is, due to a 
continuous deflationary process, mired in a classic Keynesian “liquidity trap”, and it is argued that above zero 
inflation caused by a deliberate monetary expansion would make monetary policy effective again. 
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authority’s loss function is one way to achieve the results of a “second-best”, commitment-type, 
equilibrium through this “constrained discretion” mechanism (see Mishkin, 2000). 
 
The exchange rate framework, of course, must be set in a consistent fashion with 
monetary framework. In a currency board mechanism, this consistent is simple and automatic: 
monetary policy is completely (in a pure currency board) endogenous to the arrangement5, since 
the monetary base must equal –at least- the amount of reserves held by the monetary authority, 
being, therefore, a framework completely determined by the exchange rate arrangement. On the 
other hand, a pure float regime (under the assumption of free movement of capital) is necessary 
for the effectiveness of an active monetary policy6.  
 
Working within such an implicit theoretical referential, Kuttner and Posen (2001) 
perform a combined empirical analysis of central bank independence, announced targets and 
exchange rate regimes for a large set of developed and developing countries in a post Bretton 
Woods time sample, and estimate that a setup that combines a free float, an independent 
monetary authority and inflation targeting yields an outcome that mimics the price 
stabilization advantages of a hard peg without its drawbacks in terms of “extreme” nominal7 
events (like very large devaluations), which could imply that a move from one framework to 
the other would be welfare improving, in a Pareto sense. Our aim is to verify if such an 
outcome is also observed in our sub-sample of Accession Countries (not covered by the 
Kuttner and Posen study). If so, the policy implications can be non-trivial. 
 
A-Estimations 
 
 Any estimations performed on the set of countries that this work address here faces 
some obvious difficulties. The time series are notoriously short (in most cases, it doesn’t 
make sense –or they are just not available, given the recent independence of some of them- to 
use data before 1992, rendering less than ten years available) and are clearly non-stationary 
(they are buffeted by the initial nominal and real shocks related to the transition process, 
which, as indicated in one of the previous section, also happened in different countries in 
different moments, and by what could be classified as “common external shocks” –again 
previously indicated- like the Russian Crisis in the second half of 1998 and the “oil shock” of 
1999-2000). 
 
 The time dimension problem is minimized by using higher frequency series available 
for most of the variables of interest to us here. Those series are matched as closely as possible 
the series with regime dummies, following whenever possible the classification used by 
Kuttner and Posen (2001), Ibiden, from now on indicated as “KP”. 
 
                                                           
5On the other hand, fiscal police is not automatically endogenized by this arrangement, and can place a serious 
strain on its sustainability, as the recent crisis in Argentina so clearly shows. The demise of its CBA -besides 
being a reminder of the potential fragility of this arrangement- did away with the myth that no “modern” CBA 
had ever collapsed. For descriptions of the monetary and currency arrangements of the ACs, see Vinhas de 
Souza, at al, 2002(a), Vinhas de Souza, 2002 (b), Vinhas de Souza and Hölscher, 2001(a) and 2001(b), Vinhas de 
Souza and Hallerberg, 2000, and Vinhas de Souza at al, 1999. 
6This is the essential insight of the so-called “Mundell-Fleming” model, which is basically the formalization of a 
Keynesian IS/LM framework in an open economy setting. 
7The explicit assumption in their work is that monetary or exchange rate arrangements have only nominal 
effects, and that real variables –like growth rates- are determined, on the long run, by the factor endowments and 
the production technology, and, on the middle to short run, by the business cycle. 
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The Central Bank Independence (CBI) dummies were constructed using as a 
reference the national Central Bank laws and their changes through time8. As KP indicates, 
from the usual criteria found in CBI-indexes, two tend to stick out in terms of their 
significance: the appointment and dismissal procedures of the head of the monetary authority 
and the prohibition (or otherwise) of monetary financing of the government debt. Here, those 
two are also used to classify the institutions either as partially independent (at least one of 
them is present) or independent (both are present). 
 
The Targeting Regime dummies used here differentiate between narrow money 
targets (M0/M1), broad money targets (M2/M3), or an explicit inflation target (be either CPI 
one, as in Poland, or a “net inflation” one, as in the Czech case). 
 
Finally, the Exchange Rate regime dummies distinguish between four de jure9 
classifications possible: CBA, hard pegs, an aggregate that encompasses sliding pegs, target 
zones and shifting baskets, and floats10. 
 
The data was taken from the IMF/IFS series, for the period from February 1989 
(Hungary was an early reformer) to May 2001. The (heteroskedasticity-consistent) 
regressions will be done upon an unbalanced panel on “calendar” time11, given that the 
individual national series have different time dimensions. 
 
The general form of the equation(s) to be estimated for all series, which corresponds 
to the KP exchange rate variability equation, is given by 
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8Cukierman at al (2001) produces an updated version of their famous index, now in terms of an yearly series for 
the period 1989-1998 that includes all countries in our sample, adding a time dimension to their analysis. One of 
their conclusions is that no level of CBI would have been able to have averted the inflationary jumps associated 
with the on-set of world price levels in the beginning of “transition”. See also Loungani and Sheets (1997) and 
Äimä (1998). 
9Certain studies stress the difference between de facto and de jure regimes. This distinction is particularly 
common on the “fear of float” literature (see Calvo and Reinhart (2000), for a recent review), and this usually 
assessed by comparing the volatility of the exchange rate with volatility of the reserves, but, as indicated by KP, 
just a de jure announcement is expected to have effects in terms of the expectations of the private agents. 
10There is one possible policy option that is not analyzed it this framework, because no Accession Country –so 
far- has used it: Euroisation. For it, see the Annex I at the end of this work. 
11Alternative estimations involving an adjustment for “transition time” were discarded by this author. In 
Bakanova at al (2001) ibid, this author estimates cross country “growth-regressions” for all the “transition” 
economies in Europe, both in “calendar” and in “transition” time, and the results do not differ in any significant 
manner: the reason for that is obvious: the further away you are from the onset of the transformation process, the 
less relevant such a distinction becomes. Alternatively, another way to deal with that would be to use a shorter, 
more recent sample, to adjust for the initial shocks related to the onset of “transition” and the “transition time” 
asymmetry. This was indeed done by this author in earlier versions of this paper, but it presented problems: as 
indicated in previous sections, all the economies in our set were being buffeted by a series of common shocks in 
the 1997-2000 period: the Asian crisis, the Russian crisis and the Energy shocks of 1999-2000. Due to that, 
some of the results were of very counterintuitive interpretation. Besides, one of our regressions (the GDP 
quarterly one, at the end of this section) just could not be estimated in this shorter sample. Decisively, the longer 
sample here used should be understood as a better approximation of the true long-run values of the parameters. 
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where V is the dependent variable, indexed for country n and period i, and the are the 
coefficients of the country and time varying dummies. I will estimate the same equation for 
all our series, as to unable a direct comparison of the results.  
 
 The set of variables is estimated both in terms of their levels but also, and mainly, on 
several “variability” measures, namely in terms of their standard deviations, the 90% standard 
deviations (i.e., excluding the extreme 5% realizations on both sides of the distribution) to 
measure eventual non-linearities of the frameworks in different portions of the distribution, 
the coefficient of skewness (which is a measure of asymmetry of the distribution of a series 
around its mean) and the coefficient of kurtosis (which measures the “peakedness” or 
“flatness” of a series, when compared to a normal distribution)12. Namely, the standard 
deviation s is here calculated as 
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while skewness is here calculated as 
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where s is the standard deviation estimated as above, and kurtosis is here calculated as  
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where s is, again, the standard deviation estimated as above. 
 
Also, to try to eliminate expectational effects -arising from regime changes that were 
credibly and previously announced- that might “contaminate” different regimes from our 
dependent variables, the same estimations were done on series that excluded the month of the 
announcement in the level series, the month of the announcement and the previous and 
precedent months in the case of the standard deviation series, the month of the announcement 
and two previous and precedent months in the case of the skewness series, and the month of 
the announcement and the three previous and precedent months in the case of the kurtosis 
series. The tables with those results are listed at the end of this section. 
 
 
                                                           
12An email discussion with Kenneth Kuttner clarified that the process in KP for the calculation of all their 
“variability” series used a sample that remained constant while all the elements of the framework remained 
unchanged. This author decided to use a centered “sliding sample” of two, there and four observation for the 
estimation, respectively, of our standard deviation(s), skewness and kurtosis series, for practical reasons: for 
countries with essentially unchanged frameworks during most of our sample the process used by KP would 
generate series that would have very few observations (or even be constant terms, like for Estonia) to be used as 
the dependent variables in our estimations. 
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Exchange Rate: 
 
The monthly series of changes in the average monthly exchange rate of the national 
currency to the USD (with the exception of Lithuania, where the DEM was used, as it was 
still on a USD peg during our sample) were used in the estimations13: negative movements 
indicate appreciation, positive ones depreciation.  
 
Table-1 
Sample: Exchange Rate: Depreciation and variability.  
 1989:01-2001:05 Depreciation Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 1.63* 2.33* 1.36* 0.28** 0.43 
CBA -0.20 1.35* 1.26* 0.11 -0.07 
Sliding Peg 1.04* 1.26* 1.00* 0.14 0.04 
Hard Peg 1.05* 1.45* 0.95* 0.31* 0.02 
Narrow Money Target 3.67 1.66 0.18 0.08 -0.13 
Broad Money Target -1.41* -0.31* -0.02 -0.07 -0.14 
Inflation Target -1.63* -0.44* 0.45* 0.09 -0.70*** 
Total CB Independence 0.48*** 0.20** -0.13 -0.26*** -0.37 
Part. CB Independence 0.77* 0.09 0.01 -0.24** -0.08 
R2 0.008 0.12 0.03 0.02 0.01 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***:significant at the 10% level. 
 
As can be seen from the estimation results in Table-1 above, in terms of changes, 
floats lead to the highest significant degree of depreciation, while other institutional 
components (namely, targeting frameworks) seems to be able to almost fully counteract this 
tendency; on the other hand, central bank independence seem to actually increase it. In terms 
of their full standard deviations, the highest volatility is indeed observed in a float –while the 
lowest is associated with a sliding peg- is partially counteracted by certain types of targeting 
frameworks, especially by inflation targeting; when using the 90% standard deviations, now 
the point estimates are roughly similar for both the float –which still has the highest value- 
and the CBA, but the lowest value is actually associated with the hard peg, and an inflation 
targeting framework would actually increase the variability. Considering the skew, the 
significant coefficients on float and hard pegs are rather similar, and the institutional 
framework could offset most of those tendencies. In terms of kurtosis, the only significant 
coefficient is associated with an inflation-targeting framework: given that it is negative, it 
may be assumed that it could be used to partially counteract a “peaked” distribution. The 
series “corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-15, Annex II) not only confirm most of 
those results, but they are actually stronger,especially for the skew and kurtosis series (the 
scale of the coefficients is, as a rule, greater, and the statististical significance stronger and 
more common). 
 
In terms of general conclusions, it could be said that any assumed substantial 
advantage in terms of lower variability associated with “harder” regimes is not observed, 
when the combined framework is taken into consideration. Also noteworthy, most of the 
gains are associated with targeting frameworks, not with the independence level of the 
monetary authority. 
                                                           
13KP also use nominal rates, due to the same data problem faced in this study: the lack of complete monthly real 
effective exchange rate series for the countries in our sample.  
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Of course, the conclusion above comes from an implicit assumption that the effects 
associated with the individual components of a joint framework would be additive14: to test 
for that, the individual elements are estimated in a “interactive dummy framework”, to 
estimate the joint effects of relevant combinations of frameworks. As we may see from the 
results of our estimation on Table-2, below, this is indeed the case: the individual elements do 
show “additive” properties, besides their individual effects. Floats combined with inflation 
targeting and a high degree of independence would yield similar results -in terms of changes 
in levels of the exchange rate- to a high independence CBA: both are among the lowest 
coefficients of level variability. The same “dampening” effect on the volatility of the float 
towards “harder” regimes’ levels is observed in terms of the standard deviations, both for the 
full and 90% series. Again, the series “corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-16, 
Annex) confirm most of those results. 
 
Table-2 
Sample: Exchange Rate: Depreciation and  variability  
 1989:01-2001:05 Dep. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 0.38* 1.65* 1.46* -0.23** -0.57* 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 0.21* 1.09* 0.98* -0.01 0.06 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target 7.00 9.91*** 0.95** 0.45 2.58* 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 1.31* 1.49* 1.36* 0.09 0.13 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
-7.91 -10.28*** -1.37* -0.69 -3.08* 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target -12.02* -3.86* 0.11 -0.37 0.32 
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 11.85* 5.05* 1.03** 0.03 -0.24 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target and Total CB 
Independence 
12.13* 4.61* 0.59 0.41 -0.93 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 5.26*** 3.96 1.53* 0.36* 0.28 
Float with a Broad Money Target 12.34** 12.44** 2.32* 0.48** 0.34 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
-11.09*** -10.30*** -0.87*** -0.61** -0.28 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CB Independence -12.58** -10.00*** -1.37* -0.15 0.35 
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CB Independence 0.49* 2.07* 1.59* 0.13 0.30 
Float with an Inflation Target and Partial CB Independence -0.09 1.94* 1.59* -0.14 -1.58** 
R2 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.03 0.03 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
 
Given the availability of monthly nominal and real effective exchange rate indexes 
series -NEEXR and REEXR- for, respectively, 8 and 9 of the countries in our sample (Latvia 
and Lithuania were the countries excluded from the nominal effective series, and Latvia from 
the real effective series), provided by the IMF/IFS database and by the national central banks, 
I also used them for some limited estimations. We must note that even some of the included 
series had a somewhat reduced temporal dimension, so those results should be examined with 
some care: they are presented in Tables V-3 to 6.  
 
 
                                                           
14This	
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Table-3 
Sample: Nominal Effective Exchange Rate Index: Depreciation and variability. 
 1989:02-2001:03 Depreciation Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 131.09* 3.21* 2.92* 0.01 -0.47 
CBA 50.82* 2.01* 1.66* 0.15 -1.02*** 
Sliding Peg 120.66* 1.79* 1.90* -0.05 -0.50** 
Hard Peg 164.01* 2.74* 2.02* -0.09 -0.34 
Narrow Money Target -25.16** 0.24 0.28 0.14 0.66 
Broad Money Target -52.66 -19.13* -8.81* -0.01 0.28 
Inflation Target -56.52* -0.93 -0.84 0.13 -0.49 
Total CB Independence 23.74* -1.52* -1.22* -0.04 0.85 
Part. CB Independence 29.34 17.31* 7.27* 0.12 0.03 
R2 0.31 0.11 0.08 0.004 0.01 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
In terms of level changes for NEEXR in Table-3 above (note that here a stable level 
would correspond to 100), floats are associated with depreciation, and CBA with a 
substantially larger appreciation, while inflation target and full central bank independence can 
counteract this. As considering the standard deviations, floats indeed show the highest one, 
but, again, total CBI would counteract this, but not to the point where it would surpass a float, 
or a sliding peg, the best performer (note also the relative greater improvement of CBA with 
90% standard deviations, an indication of the harder regime bias to “extreme events”). The 
additive regressions in Table-4 confirm those results (the almost completely stable NEEXR 
with a float cum CBI and DIT is noteworthy, as is the rather small standard deviation 
“advantage” of a harder regime). 
 
Table-4 
Sample: NEER Index: Depreciation and variability. 
 1989:01-2001:05 Dep. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 83.60* 0.82* 0.83* 0.11 -0.19 
CBA with Partial CB Independence      
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target 3638.93* 168.07 168.07 0.35 1.07 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 110.78* 1.27* 1.29* 0.06 -0.48* 
Sliding Peg with Broad Money Target and Partial CBI -3647.23* -168.76 -168.78 -0.38 -0.83 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target      
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 1006.01* 93.68* 49.51* 0.26 -0.31 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
-906.63** -93.44* -49.28* -0.33 0.03 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 105.55* 3.44* 3.20* 0.15 0.20 
Float with a Broad Money Target 399.15* 57.29 57.29 0.06 -0.47 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
-305.69* -56.43 -56.37 0.04 0.64 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CB 
Independence 
     
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CBI  99.16* 0.89* 0.89* 0.10 -0.03 
Float with Inflation Target and Partial CBI 78.14* 1.04* 1.03* 0.20 -1.42** 
R2 0.99 0.10 0.07 0.006 0.01 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
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For REEXR level series in Table-5 below it is noteworthy that a float, as one could 
expect, per se, is almost all that is necessary for a stable exchange rate (while CBAs are 
associated with the highest level of depreciation), and that CBI and DIT partially counteract 
each other effects. In terms of standard deviations, the highest value is associated with a CBA 
–and, again, the lowest with sliding pegs, and the float variation can be almost totally 
counteracted by full CBI with a targeting framework (again, the use of 95% standard 
deviations shows the larger relative improvement of a harder regimes, confirming the 
tendency to “extreme events” of those arrangements).  
Table-5 
Sample: Real Effective Exchange Rate Index: Depreciation and variability. 
 1989:02-2001:03 Depreciation Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 100.77* 1.59* 1.54* -0.33** -0.32 
CBA 124.93* 1.61* 1.14* -0.00 0.04 
Sliding Peg 102.03* 0.92* 0.80* -0.03 -0.36 
Hard Peg 92.05* 1.10* 0.94* -0.04 -0.15 
Narrow Money Target -1.86 1.13** 1.20** 0.36*** 0.20 
Broad Money Target 6.25* -0.45* -0.64* 0.19 0.02 
Inflation Target 23.64* 0.10 -0.44* 0.31 0.50 
Total CB Independence -10.76* -0.56** -0.11 -0.02 -0.36 
Part. CB Independence -4.87* 0.05 0.38** 0.04 0.06 
R2 0.95 0.01 0.01 0.006 0.003 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
Also, again the additivity assumption, tested in Table-6 below is confirmed as 
statistically significant, and supports the previous results.  
 
Table-6 
Sample: Real Effective Exchange Rate Index: Depreciation and 
variability. 
 1989:01-2001:05 Dep. Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 114.27* 1.10* 1.08* 0.00 -0.43*** 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 129.86* 1.33* 1.31* 0.02 0.26 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target 121.89* 7.68** 7.68** 0.23 -0.47 
Sliding Peg with Partial CBI 102.34* 1.11* 1.09* 0.06 -0.25 
Sliding Peg with Broad Money Target & Partial CBI 122.55* -8.18** -8.14** -0.14 0.54 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target      
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 62.40* 2.85* 2.75* -0.01 -0.02 
Hard Peg with Broad Money Target and Partial CBI 34.41* -2.45* -2.34* 0.28 -0.16 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 97.86* 2.71* 2.74* 0.02 -0.12 
Float with a Broad Money Target 88.42* 4.97 4.72 -0.12 -0.22 
Float with Broad Money Target and Partial CBI  15.53* -3.86 -3.41 0.01 -0.22 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CBI      
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CBI 113.79 1.11* 0.94* -0.11 0.13 
Float with an Inflation Target and Partial CBI 125.12* 1.60* 1.56* 0.24 -0.74 
R2 0.98 0.02 0.005 0.005 0.004 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
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And again, the series “corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-17 and V-18, 
Annex) –done only for the REER series- confirm those results. 
 
As a general conclusion for the block of tested exchange rate series –nominal, 
nominal effective or real effective, the assumed advantage of harder regimes in terms of 
variability is not empirically observed. 
 
Inflation: 
 
 
Here, monthly CPI series were used as the dependent nominal variable. The results of 
the estimation on Table-7 below, in terms of levels, floats lead to a marginally higher 
inflation level than a CBA, but the lowest inflation is actually associated with pegs, while 
other institutional components (namely, inflation targeting and CBI) would seem to be able to 
almost fully counteract it. In terms of their full standard deviations, the highest volatility is 
again indeed observed in a float, but is only marginally greater them the one in a CBA, and, 
once again, the lowest is associated with a peg, but this can be partially counteracted by the 
CBI level; when using the 90% standard deviations, the float still has the highest value and 
the CBA the lowest, and a targeting framework (especially inflation targeting) would 
decrease the variability. Considering the skew, the significant coefficients on float, CBA and 
pegs are rather similar: the CBI institutional framework would actually increase those 
tendencies, but targeting frameworks could contain it. In terms of kurtosis, the picture is 
rather similar. 
 
Table-7 
Sample: CPI: Level and variability.   
 1989:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 3.40* 1.39* 0.70* 2.22* 11.68* 
CBA 3.42* 1.32* 0.49* 2.10* 10.83* 
Sliding Peg 2.55* 1.04* 0.58* 2.08* 9.85* 
Hard Peg 2.69* 1.15* 0.63* 1.72* 6.47* 
Narrow Money Target 1.07 0.24 0.59* 0.04 -2.97* 
Broad Money Target 0.43 0.00 -0.35* -1.47* -9.26* 
Inflation Target -1.17*** -0.44 -0.63* -1.26* -7.58* 
Total CB Independence -1.74* -0.45 0.20 2.68* 16.87* 
Part. CB Independence -2.37* -0.80* 0.03 1.20* 6.80* 
R2 0.02 0.002 0.05 0.43 0.30 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
Again, our conclusion is that the assumed advantage in terms of lower variability 
associated with “harder” regimes is not clearly registered, and, again, most of the gains in 
terms of volatility are associated with targeting frameworks, and not necessarily with the 
independence level of the monetary authority. This is also observed at the series “corrected” 
for expectational effects (see Table-19, Annex II). 
 
As we see in Table-8 below, the “additive” assumption is again confirmed: Floats 
combined with inflation targeting and a high degree of independence would yield the lowest 
average inflation (the large negative significant coefficient for the float with money targeting 
and a partial degree of independence is of difficult interpretation) and the lowest standard 
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deviations, both for the full and 90% series, while the lowest skew and one of the lowest 
excess kurtosis are associated with the combination that includes money targeting. Again, the 
series “corrected” for expectations (see Table-20, Annex II) yield similar results. 
 
Table-8 
Sample: CPI: Level and variability.   
 1989:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 1.24* 14.91* 0.64* 5.45* 39.53* 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 0.98* 7.90* 0.56* 1.92* 5.92* 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target 10.04* 7.66* 2.71* 0.67* 2.15* 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 1.73* 11.95* 0.68* 4.21* 23.16* 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target and 
Partial CB Independence 
-11.12 -19.16* -3.12* -3.71* -20.48* 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target -11.68 -15.30* -1.05* -0.65* -1.94* 
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 12.45* 15.72* 1.33* 1.48* 4.96* 
Hard Peg with Broad Money Target & Total CBI 12.45* 23.81* 1.49* 3.98* 17.96* 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 4.39* 10.56* 1.26* 2.33* 9.24* 
Float with a Broad Money Target 8.89* 6.36* 1.74* 1.07* 3.98* 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Partial CBI -7.78* -3.91* -1.41* 1.59* 8.43* 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CBI -2.19 6.73* -0.02 0.26* 0.14 
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CBI 0.49* 0.67* 0.25* 2.46* 11.37* 
Float with an Inflation Target and Partial CBI  0.53* 9.21* 0.25* 5.55* 38.01* 
R2 0.01 0.81 0.18 0.82 0.83 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
Interest rates: 
 
Estimating the same equation for the real interest rate15 the results listed at Table-9 
below are found. 
 
Table-9 
Sample: Real Interest Rate: Level and variability  
 1989:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 50.20* 7.18* 2.34* 0.81* 6.96* 
CBA 31.43* 3.61 0.60* -3.17* -16.76* 
Sliding Peg 24.48* 1.44* 0.71* 0.05 3.05* 
Hard Peg 28.69* 2.31* 1.26* -0.15* 1.90* 
Narrow Money Target 9.92* 0.50*** 1.39** -1.45* 6.12* 
Broad Money Target 4.76 1.16 -0.91* -3.23* -20.13* 
Inflation Target -26.90* -4.66** -2.41* -2.10** 2.72 
Total CB Independence -13.84* -1.93 0.65 3.86* 20.58* 
Part. CB Independence -17.02* -2.40 0.52 4.62* 25.22* 
R2 0.37 0.06 0.02 0.30 0.16 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***:  significant at the 10% level. 
                                                           
15
“Real Interest Rate” is here defined as just the lending rate in time t minus the consumer price inflation 
realized also on time t. No consistent series of “expected inflation” would be available for all countries 
throughout all the sample. 
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In terms of levels, floats lead to the highest interest rate levels, and pegs the lowest, 
while the other components (namely, inflation targeting and CBI) would again seem to be 
able to substantially reduce it. Again, in terms of their full standard deviations, the highest 
volatility is, by far, again observed in a float, but this can be partially counteracted by a 
inflation targeting framework; when using the 90% standard deviations, the float still has the 
highest value and the CBA the lowest, and inflation targeting would still decrease the 
variability substantially. Considering the skew, the lowest significant coefficients is on the 
float, the CBI institutional framework would actually increase those tendencies, but targeting 
frameworks could contain it. Again, in terms of kurtosis, the picture is rather similar. The 
coefficients from the series “corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-21, Annex II) 
again confirm those results. 
 
As we see in Table below, the “additive” assumption is once again confirmed: Floats 
combined with inflation targeting and a high degree of independence would yield the lowest 
positive real interest rates and the lowest standard deviations and the lowest skew, but the 
lowest excess kurtosis are associated with CBA, followed by the float cum CBI cum IT. 
Again, the series “corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-22, Annex II) yield similar 
results. 
 
Table-10 
Sample: Real Interest Rate: Level and variability  
 1991:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 14.62* 15.02* 1.15* 0.79* 3.43* 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 19.63*   0.85* 3.00* 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 27.43* 530.84* 0.93* 8.54* 77.95* 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target and 
Partial CB Independence 
-14.81* -530.09* -0.51* -8.17* -74.28* 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target 203.45 -680.67* -4.32* -2.88* -12.04* 
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 215.96 681.31* 4.72* 2.78* 14.15* 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target and Total 
CB Independence 
225.75 698.31* 5.94* 3.55* 14.59* 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 59.27* 23.88* 3.73* -0.57 10.54* 
Float with a Broad Money Target 70.23* 14.50* 2.80* 2.01* 6.53* 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
-51.52* 74.73* -1.09* 
 
 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CB 
Independence 
-2.26 -8.29* -0.36* 
 
 
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CB 
Independence 
9.43* 1.46* 0.53* -0.41* 4.11* 
Float with an Inflation Target and Partial CB 
Independence 
19.71* 388.34* 0.40* 11.37* 132.65* 
R2 0.62 0.67 0.04 0.72 0.56 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
So far, our set of nominal variables confirms –with surprisingly robust results- the 
outcome of KP: when taken into consideration as a combined framework, harder regimes do 
not necessarily outperform floating ones, either in terms of level or variability (regardless of 
the exclusion or not of extreme events). 
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B-Real variables16 
 
One of the underlying assumption of the previous estimations was that nominal 
frameworks, as the ones analyzed here, would only have effects in terms of nominal variables. 
Nevertheless, several works do try to access the effects of exchange rate frameworks on growth 
rates (for an empirical estimation, see Ghosh at al, 1997, for a model based simulation for the 
Accession Countries, see Vinhas de Souza and Ledrut, 2002), albeit it is not clear a priori why 
and through which channels a nominal mechanism would have persistent effects in real 
variables’ growth paths (and, indeed, but studies above tend to find that the differences in 
growth performance of different regimes tends to be non-significant). Nevertheless, a recent 
work by Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2001) find consistent positive growth effects from float 
regimes, using modified Barro-type “growth equations”17. On the other hand, and far less 
controversially, one of the major assumed advantages associated with floating regimes is indeed 
their assumed capacity to smooth or cushion shocks, which would indicate that they might affect 
the “variability” of real variables. Therefore, and as a consistency test, the framework above was 
extended to real series. Given that I deal here with monthly and quarterly data, the effects could 
be understood as the short run effects of the framework on their level and variability. 
 
Unemployment: 
 
 As the first of our two real variable series, monthly unemployment series were used. 
A series of provisos must be made here concerning our data in this section: all the countries 
in our sample suffered massive productive dislocations with the onset of transition, leading to 
high, and, in some cases, due to skills mismatch, persistent unemployment levels. Also, 
ethnic and linguistic concerns, especially in the Baltic countries, may contribute to above 
equilibrium unemployment levels, while, on the other hand, the official registered 
unemployment series may likely suffer from a downward bias (see IMF, 2001 (b)). Finally, 
this is a shorter sample, starting only on January 1991. 
 
Table-11 
Sample: Unemployment: Level and variability.  
 1989:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 11.56* 0.03 0.23* -0.39* 1.88* 
CBA 7.08* 0.05 0.27* -0.30* 2.29* 
Sliding Peg 9.44* 0.20* 0.24* -0.11* 3.40* 
Hard Peg 7.20* 0.40* 0.19* -0.32* 2.23* 
Narrow Money Target -1.43** 0.22* 0.01 -0.44* 1.21* 
Broad Money Target -2.50* 0.17* -0.02 -0.30* 1.34* 
Inflation Target -3.69* 0.03 0.02 1.12* 0.70* 
Total CB Independence 2.89* 0.29* -0.08* -0.39* 0.88* 
Part. CB Independence 4.39* -0.05* -0.07* 0.02 -0.07 
R2 0.82 0.25 0.01 0.45 0.27 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
                                                           
16In this section, the IMF/IFS series were complemented with data from the Vienna Institute for Comparative 
International Studies (WIIW). 
17Those effects are due completely to the developing countries in their sample (which do includes all the 
Accession Countries, with the exception of Hungary), and the results are robust to the introduction of, among 
other test, regional dummies. 
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Estimating the same equation as before for the unemployment rate I get the results at 
Table-11 above: in terms of levels, floats lead to the highest unemployment levels and CBAs 
to the lowest (perhaps as an indication that one of the assumed mechanism to underpin the 
sustainability of a currency board, namely, flexible labor markets, is indeed present those 
countries), while inflation targeting frameworks would be able to reduce it, and CBI would 
actually increase it. The significant standard deviations are rather small and similar across 
regimes, with some targeting frameworks increasing it, and CBI decreasing it. Considering 
the skew and the kurtosis, the picture is similar. As we see in Table-12 below, the “additive” 
assumption is once again confirmed, and here, the assumed variability advantages of more 
flexible regimes is more strongly observed.  Both set of results are confirmed by the series 
“corrected” for expectational effects (see Table-23 and 24, Annex II). 
 
Table-12 
Sample: Unemployment: Level and variability  
 1991:01-2001:05 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 11.39* 2.40* 0.18*  3.30* 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 7.41* 1.42* 0.20* 0.03 2.32* 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 13.36* 2.56* 0.17* -0.72*  
Sliding Peg with Broad Money Target & Partial CBI -1.12* 0.02 -0.02 -0.66* 4.95* 
Hard Peg with a Broad Money Target -5.30* 0.02 -0.31* -0.77* 1.81* 
Hard Peg with Partial CB Independence 8.39* 0.68* 0.39* 0.38* 1.77* 
Hard Peg with Broad Money Target & Total CBI 12.88* 1.17* 0.40* -0.21** 2.60* 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 10.29* 2.61* 0.24* -0.86* 3.23* 
Float with a Broad Money Target 8.63* 1.89* 0.22* -0.39* 2.02* 
Float with Broad Money Target & Partial CBI 5.32* -0.53* -0.08* -0.65* 1.86* 
Float with Broad Money Target & Total CBI -3.76* -1.05* -0.08* 0.04 -0.19* 
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CBI 7.52* 1.55* 0.16* 0.90* 3.71* 
Float with an Inflation Target & Partial CBI 14.53* 2.42* 0.16* -0.46* 2.56* 
R2 0.86 0.85 0.00 0.52 0.81 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***:significant at the 10% level. 
 
Nevertheless, in terms of a general conclusion, the prior of a worst employment 
variability performance of harder regimes as compared to floats is, perhaps surprisingly, not 
so clearly confirmed (this is true to a lesser degree, using 90% standard deviations). 
 
GDP: 
 
 As the second of our two real variable series, quarterly GDP series were used18. 
Again, here, a proviso: not all countries produce adequately long quarterly GDP series, so for 
half of our sample (Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia) industrial production 
series were used instead. As is know, industrial production can be a somewhat unreliable 
proxy for GDP19. Those nominal series are turned into real series (using the CPI as a 
                                                           
18Due to the quarterly periodicity, the “correction” for expectational effects was not done on this series. 
19As a matter of fact, comparing the available short quarterly GDP series with the corresponding samples of the 
–available for much longer periods- Industrial Production series yielded an amazing 97% correlation for 
Hungary and Slovakia, and 87% for Slovenia. The smaller result was observed for Poland (-70%). As indicated 
before, Romania do not produces quarterly GDP series. 
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deflator), and them into indexes’ series, the natural logs of which are used as the dependent 
variable on our regressions. 
 
Estimating the same equation for the “GDP” series, I get the results at Table-13, 
below: in terms of levels, CBAs slightly outperform all other regimes, but the use of inflation 
targeting would more than fully compensate this difference. The standard deviations, on the 
other hand, are substantially smaller under a float, with inflation targeting increasing it 
somewhat, but this is counteracted by the institutional framework. Considering the skew, the 
float is the highest, but some targeting frameworks and CBI can control for this. In terms of 
the kurtosis, inflation targeting could help a float approach a normal distribution. 
 
Table-13 
Sample: GDP: Level and  variability.   
 1989:1-2001:2 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
Float 1.98* 0.01* 0.013* 0.78* -0.68*** 
CBA 2.01* 0.04* 0.040* 0.44*** 0.12 
Sliding Peg 1.99* 0.02* 0.020* 0.31*** -0.27 
Hard Peg 1.97* 0.03* 0.022* 0.61* -0.18 
Narrow Money Target -0.03 0.01 0.001 -0.99* 0.23 
Broad Money Target -0.03 0.00 0.000 -0.50** 0.55 
Inflation Target 0.03** 0.01* -0.013* 0.06 2.02* 
Total CB Independence -0.01 -0.00* -0.011* -0.65** -0.41 
Part. CB Independence 0.00 -0.00* -0.008 -0.43** -0.20 
R2 0.99 0.23 0.20 0.10 0.05 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***: significant at the 10% level. 
 
The “dummy interaction” estimations mostly support those results (see Table-14, 
below). 
 
Table-14 
Sample: GDP: Level and  variability.   
 1989:1-2001:2 Level Std. Dev. Std. Dev. 90% Skewness Kurtosis 
CBA with Total CB Independence 1.89* 0.026* 0.026* -0.20 -0.90** 
CBA with Partial CB Independence 1.89* 0.036* 0.035* -0.01 0.34 
Sliding Peg with a Broad Money Target 0.47* 0.007* 0.009* -0.52* 0.56 
Sliding Peg with Partial CB Independence 1.54* 0.010* 0.009* -0.19 -0.20 
Hard Peg with Total CB Independence 2.05* 0.009* 0.009* -0.58** 0.14 
Hard Peg with Broad Money Target and Partial CBI 1.96* 0.017* 0.016* 0.4 0.20 
Float with a Narrow Money Target 1.91* 0.017* 0.016* -0.22 -0.50 
Float with a Broad Money Target 1.95* 0.020* 0.016* 0.03 0.36 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Partial CBI 0.05* -0.015* -0.011 -0.15 -0.86 
Float with a Broad Money Target and Total CBI 0.05*     
Float with an Inflation Target and Total CBI 1.98* 0.017* 0.017* 0.23 1.23* 
Float with an Inflation Target and Partial CBI 2.02* 0.008* 0.008 0.41 -1.49 
R2 0.99 0.45 0.38 0.09 0.10 
*: significant at the 1% level, **: significant at the 5% level; ***:significant at the 10% level. 
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As a conclusion, the variability and level of our “GDP” series does seem to be, 
respectively, smaller and greater under more flexible regimes. Therefore, here the usual 
priors about the regimes do seem to have been confirmed20. 
 
 
C-Conclusions 
 
 
The aim of this section was to access if a combined framework that included the 
exchange rate arrangement, the institutional set-up of the monetary authority and the 
existence of different types of targeting frameworks would yield differences in terms of the 
level and variability of a set of nominal and real variables for a sample made of Accession 
Countries, following a methodology developed by Kuttner and Posen (2001, Ibiden). 
 
Our results confirm most of the ones obtained by KP: once you take into 
consideration a combined framework with the three elements above, the assumed advantages 
of harder exchange rate regimes in terms of, if not the level, but at least the variability of 
series like exchange rate changes, inflation and interest rates, when compared with floating 
regimes, is no longer observed. 
 
In addition to the work carried by KP, one of the fundamental underlying assumption 
in their conclusions is the “additivity” of the significant effects estimated for the individual 
component of a combined framework (which they do not test). This was assessed via the use 
of “interactive dummy models”, and this assumed additive nature of the individual effects is 
indeed observed in those estimations. 
 
Most of gains in the reduction of the variability can be linked to the use of targeting 
frameworks, especially inflation targeting. The level of independence of the monetary 
authority is also a significant element in terms of the effects of the arrangement, but given 
that the credibility effects associated with it can also be achieved within the institutional set-
up of harder regimes, the additional gains registered by the more flexible regimes must come 
from the targeting mechanism. 
 
 In an another addition to KP’s work, this paper also estimated the effects of the 
combined frameworks in the level and variance of a set of real variables. The results here are 
less strong than the ones for the nominal set, mostly due to data problems, but at least 
partially the traditional assumption of a smaller real volatility associated with more flexible 
regimes seems to be confirmed. 
 
 Taken together and at face value, the conclusion from the estimations with both sets 
of nominal and real variables would be that it would be Pareto-improving from an economy 
to switch from a harder regime to a more flexible one –if that change were coupled with CBI 
and DIT, given that no losses would be incurred in terms of nominal variability, and gains 
would be observed in terms of real variability. 
 
                                                           
20A question not addressed here is that smaller, less diversified, more open economies could have a greater GDP 
variability than larger, more closed ones, regardless of the type of combined framework used. This question 
arises due to the fact that, in our sample, after the initial widespread use of external anchors, only the smaller 
economies consistently used harder regimes. Such a hypothesis could be tested with a larger set of countries. 
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 Nevertheless, to derive hard policy conclusions from this set of estimations is a more 
problematic proposition. To start with general questions, the data is rather limited in terms of 
time and has several shortcomings, as indicated previously. Also, our sample uses a very 
specific set of countries in a very particular moment in their histories. Of course, the broader 
conclusion are strikingly similar to the KP ones, derived from a much larger set of countries 
with a much longer time sample, so their overall robustness can be assumed. It also assumes 
that countries can actually choose their exchange rate framework, i.e., that this is not 
endogenously determined by structural factors like size, productive structure, etc. (for a 
recent work that supports this “endogeneity” view, see Poirson (2001)). On the other hand, 
another view of “endogeneity”, and one that actually underpins the current EU integration 
efforts, would see the structure as endogenous to the policy choice, so an arrangement that 
may not be optimal ex ante becomes optimal ex post (see Frankel and Rose (1997)). Also, 
some of the observed outcomes may be due to non-considered factors (like labor market 
institutions, the size and openness of the economy and a worldwide environment of low 
inflation during most of the 90s). Perhaps more fundamentally, the conclusion about the net 
Pareto-improving nature of a switch of frameworks do not assume any kind of eventual costs 
associated with the change-over: it is very easy to conceive that credibility losses could be -
under certain circumstances- incurred during the change, preventing the country in question 
from achieving the expected gains. Of course, any credibility losses leading to eventual 
speculative attacks would arise not from the regime switch per se, but from wrong policy 
mixes or fundamentals perceived as unsustainable by market agents, which would have 
negative effects under any type of combined frameworks. 
 
Also, on sheer operational terms, the effectiveness of a DIT framework hangs on the 
stability of the transmission mechanism of monetary policy –i.e., on functioning financial 
markets, and on the availability of an effective model to forecast inflation in an economy21, 
and on the openness and transparency of the whole procedure to economic agents, so that 
they can understand and anticipate monetary policy actions22. Therefore, no economy during 
the early stages of the transition process would have been able to successfully implement a 
DIT framework23, but, after all, “transition” started a full decade ago24, and the conditions are 
plainly there in a –growing- subset of the Accession Countries for its effective introduction25. 
 
                                                           
21Given that monetary policy actions feed into the wider economy with a lag that can be as long as 18-24 
months, in practical terms inflation targeting means inflation forecast targeting. 
22This, of course, also imply that the private agents must “know the model” which is being used by the monetary 
authority. 
23For some works on DIT in the Accession Countries, see Christoffersen and Wescott (1999) and Orlowski 
(2001) and (2000). 
24And, for some authors, it has effectively ended, at least for the Accession Countries: see Gros and Suhrcke 
(2000) and Weder (2001). This author actually agrees with this notion, which explains his reluctance to use the 
term “transition”. 
25Also, arguably the “best performing” monetary authority in the EU –in terms of a inflation cum GDP welfare 
function- since the second half of the 1990s is the that transparent inflation targeter, the Bank of England (the 
efforts it does towards making even its modeling tools reproducible are truly commendable), and not that old 
1980s favorite, the former monetary targeter, the Bundesbank. A comparative study of the Bank of England and 
the “Buba” -and now the ECB, could yield valuable insights towards policy formulation and implementation for 
the Euroarea itself. 
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Annex I: Euroisation 
 
 
 An alternative regime is the so-called (unilateral) Euroisation, the regional variation 
of a process through which a country abandons its legal currency and fully switches to a 
foreign legal tender. Several authors have defended it as an option for the Accession 
Countries (see Schoors (2001), van Foreest and de Vries (2001), Ibiden, Gros and Schobert 
(2001) and Nuti (2000)). Many examples exist of such a process involving the USD, 
specifically in Latin America: recently, both El Salvador and Ecuador decided for this 
arrangement. Panama is an early example, but this is linked to its status as a territory which 
gained independence with American support during the construction of the Panama Channel, 
at the beginning of the XXth. Century, and that until the end of the last century had a sizeable 
chunk of its territory under American administration (peculiarly, the US dollar is again legal 
tender also in Cuba –a former American colony, from the 1898 “Spanish American War” 
until 1910, when the US Congress granted it partial autonomy- since 1993, a measure taken 
to alleviate the scarcity of hard currency, since the collapse of the Soviet Union deprived 
Cuba from its main external supporter26, by legalizing the hidden stocks of US currency sent 
to Cuban relatives by Cuban immigrants in the US).   
 
The key distinguishing feature of this arrangement is that the costs of exiting it are 
greater even than the ones related to scrapping of a currency board (but, obviously, the exit 
probability is still non zero: as any former member of the Soviet Union knows, no monetary 
arrangement is forever), therefore increasing the credibility of the commitment. 
 
Amongst its benefits we may include: 
 
-Elimination of currency risk and associated speculative attacks; 
-Full “credibility import”; 
-Elimination of liquidity risk; 
-Reduction in financing spreads. 
 
Some of those benefits are realized under other types of exchange rate arrangements (namely, 
hard pegs or CBAs, as they are fundamentally similar systems), but not to the degree 
assumed possible under Euroisation. 
 
Some of its’ expected costs are: 
 
-Loss of the adjustment tool of exchange rates; 
-Loss of  “Lender of Last Resort” capabilities27; 
                                                           
26In an unpublished work done by this author during his “United Nations” days, it was estimated that explicit 
and implicit Soviet transfers and subsides amounted, at its peak during the early 1980’s, to roughly half of the 
whole Cuban GDP. 
27As 97% of the banking system in Estonia is foreign owned –56% of the sector belongs to Hansapank, which is 
owned by Swedebank, 28% of the sector to Uhisbank –“The Union Bank”- which is owned by another Swedish 
financial conglomerate, S.E. Banken, the Finish bank Sampo has 7% of the market to its Estonian subsidiary and 
a further 6% of the market is controlled by another Finish entity, Merita Nordbanken- the LLR problem there 
has been, effectively, “externalized” to ESCB monetary authorities and their respective fiscal ones. Anyway, 
given that the total reserves of the Bank of Estonia totaled 620 Million Euros in 2000, while only demand 
deposits in the banking systems reached around 1.4 Billion Euros (total liabilities to customers surpassed 2.2 
Billion Euro) for the same period, and the limited fiscal capacity of the Estonian Treasury, any domestic LLR 
facilities, regardless of the CBA nature of its arrangement, would be rather limited indeed. 
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-Loss of seigniorage. 
 
Again, under a pure CBA structure, the first two items already happen, therefore, in 
principle, Euroisation should dominate alternatives like hard pegs and CBAs.  
 
It may be assumed that the smaller Accession Countries with harder regimes would be 
the ones most likely to find such an option actually attractive28. This work will use a cursory 
estimation for Estonia of potential gains and losses as a benchmark for this set of countries.  
 
In terms of gains from a convergence to EU lending rates, from 1999 onwards, the 
short run nominal EU lending rates were actually above the level for Estonia (marginally in 
1999, but by over 2 p.p in 2000), as short-run rates were determined by the liquidity 
conditions of short-run assets denominated in Estonian Kroons. On the other hand, the long 
run rates implied by the EEK-EUR swap curve indicate that the long-run rates domestic 
Estonian rates were above comparable EU ones by almost a full percentage point (which 
maybe explained by the lack of liquid domestic long term assets). Assuming that at short run 
maturities, the rates would be still determined by domestic liquidity conditions even after 
Euroisation, but that the long run ones would converge to the EU level, Euroisation would 
imply a reduction of almost a full percentage point29, yielding potential gains of 20 Million 
Euros annually. Other gains would arise from the elimination of the currency conversion 
costs (estimated at 0.25% of the GDP for 2000, or 12 Million Euros yearly)30. 
 
In terms of losses from “seignoriage”, the cost of unilateral Euroisation would be the 
sum of the “stock” loss, which would amount to the one-off cost related to the replacement of 
the currency in circulation (roughly 9% of the Estonian GDP in 2000, 4.9 Billion Euros, or 
440 Million Euros) plus the “flow” losses, arising from the interest income earned from 
reserves (17 Million Euros yearly31). But, of course, obviously the opportunity costs of 
unilateral Euroisation have to be compared with the costs of “multilateral”, official 
Euroisation, i.e., full Euroarea membership, one of the ultimate goals of the current 
integration process, so some of the costs above would have to be eventually incurred anyway. 
The Bank of Estonia would have to “pay” for the privilege of ECB membership, in terms of a 
contribution to the ECB capital subscription, of currently around 55 Billion Euros, calculated 
in terms of a weighted average of the Estonian share of population to the EU total population 
and of the Estonian share of GDP to the total EU GDP32. Such one-off “set-up” costs could 
be estimated at around 120 Million Euros (in turn, the ECB would provide the necessary. 
amounts for the domestic currency replacement) The subsequent seigniorage sharing through 
the ECB structure would also compensate the seigniorage loss. 
                                                           
28Wójcik (2001) supplies a good example of a “large” country -with a flexible exchange rate arrangement- 
negative perspective on Euroisation. 
29Public and private debt stocks are less the 50% of GDP in Estonia, which helps to explain these relatively 
reduced gains. 
30See Sulling (2001), for a very interesting work on Estonia and Euroisation. 
31In macro terms, there would be no effective “stock” loss, as the backing of the currency in circulation already 
effectively exists in Euros held by the Estonian monetary authority, and even in a unilateral Euroisation 
scenario, the Bank of Estonia, or any monetary or supervisory organization that would take its role, would still 
earn income from the obligatory and excess reserves deposited by the financial institutions, so this loss would be 
only partially realized.  
Other related loss would be the lack of representation of Estonia in the Governing Council of the ECB, and, 
therefore, the lack of consideration of the particular economic conditions of Estonia when interest rate decisions 
are taken. Nevertheless, given the marginal size of Estonia in relation to the Euroarea, such weight would be 
truly minor in any case. 
32Article n° 29 of the ECB Protocol n° 18 (see ECB, 2001). 
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Of course, these cost of Euroisation are a decreasing function of effective degree of 
Euroisation: it is only reasonable to assume that, coming January 2002, a substantial degree 
of effective Euroisation will inevitable happen in Estonia, regardless of the current legal 
limitations to the use of a foreign currency as a means of exchange in cash transaction, due to 
its strong trade links with the Euroarea and the substantial inflow of tourists from Euroarea 
countries, specially Finland. 
 
Therefore, it can be tentatively concluded that, on balance, the net economic gains of 
Euroisation would not be necessarily very large. The expected gains would only decidedly 
surpass the ones obtained under the currently used CBA regime, and the opportunity costs of 
multilateral Euroisation, in a scenario of delayed Euroarea participation. 
 
Considering the political economy dimension of this debate, the EU institutions seems 
to present, so far, a clear instance against Euroisation33, seemingly due to an unstated fear of 
loosing control over the Euroarea monetary aggregates and of the effects that countries that 
might be perceived to have weaker financial systems and budgetary positions might have on 
the value of the Euro itself, through an implicit “bail-out” commitment34. Also, there are 
some stated legal objections to Euroisation based on specific readings of the EU treaties, but 
both the legal and the economic objections seem to be based on very few substantial studies 
by any of the EU institutions, and, of course, it cannot be a healthy position in a democratic 
Union to preclude what may amount to a defensible policy choice in an unclear basis: 
Euroisation may even not be a good or viable option for the Accession Countries, but it 
should not be a priori excluded.  
 
As a final remark, the fear expressed by some of a negative EU reaction that could 
compromise the Enlargement process for the “offending” nation that would dare to 
unilaterally “Euroise” do not seem to be credible: it is unlikely that the EU would held such a 
                                                           
33
“… the ERM II is flexible enough to accommodate the features of a number of existing exchange rate 
strategies. The only clear incompatibilities with the ERM II that can be identified already at this stage are the 
cases of free floating (or managed floats without a mutually agreed central rate), crawling pegs, and pegs 
against anchors other than the Euro. … it should be made clear that any unilateral adoption of the single 
currency by means of “Euroisation” would run counter to the underlying economic reasoning of EMU in the 
Treaty, which foresees the eventual adoption of the Euro as the endpoint of a structured convergence process 
within a multilateral framework. Therefore, unilateral “Euroisation” would not be a way to circumvent the 
stages foreseen by the Treaty for the adoption of the Euro”. Excerpts from the Ecofin (2000), Ibiden. 
34Such fears runs counter the actual experience of the DEM, before its integration into the Euro basket, as it was 
used, to different degrees, as a parallel currency in several Eastern European economies, and against the ongoing 
situation of the USD. 
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politically important process as the Enlargement hostage to the eventual “punishment” of a 
country that would be taking an action that, to start with, would be fundamentally in 
accordance with the aims of a deeper European integration, the very objective of the 
existence of the European Union35. 
                                                           
35This said, most analysts, including this author, agree that such fears will make most likely that the first 
countries to engage in unilateral Euroisation will be the ones of the non-Accession set found in the Balkans: 
Montenegro, Kosovo, Croatia, Bosnia, eventually even the (remainder of) The Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. 
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Annex II- Series “Corrected” for Expectational Effects 
 
Table-15 
Variable DEP SD SD90 SK KU 
Float 2.160136* 11.68103* 1.861016* 0.918113* 3.954147* 
CBA 0.659742* -4.079370* 1.566522* 1.848242* 4.543306* 
Sliding Peg 1.571016* -5.926581* 1.476051* 1.296922* 3.641103* 
Hard Peg 1.392953* -7.816124* 1.359785* 1.664140* 3.935785* 
Narrow Money Target 2.155235** 727.9042* -0.302958 0.007708 -0.127229 
Broad Money Target -0.888963* -0.309842* -0.128994* 0.255475* 0.173466** 
Inflation Target -1.351407* -12.23498* 0.203089 0.438431* -0.343787*** 
Total CB Independence -0.403477** 3.730946* -0.430005*** -0.815117* -1.016342* 
Part. CB Independence -0.246211 9.610728* -0.391514 -1.365279* -1.537672* 
R-squared 0.000883 0.389730 0.045088 0.255213 0.238094 
Adjusted R-squared -0.006085 0.385401 0.036830 0.249826 0.232476 
S.E. of regression 22.71337 515.3856 1.479059 0.844649 2.091734 
Log likelihood -3557.409 -4927.808 -1428.839 -1241.934 -1755.349 
Durbin-Watson stat 1.277997 0.003217 1.626964 0.049336 0.081573 
 
 
 
Table-16 
Variable DEP SD SD90 SK KU 
FOREXCBA*CBIT 0.376265* 0.966470* 1.459454* 0.104418* 2.231511* 
FOREXCBA*CBIP 0.205825* 0.286619* 0.969259* 2.135864* 12.51938* 
FOREXSPEG*CBIP 0.785415* 3.859299* 1.039421* 0.108823* 2.122542* 
FOREXHPEG*CBIP 0.956353* 1.130742* 1.039127* -0.004243 2.152631* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMN 4.343377* 740.3032* 1.559561* 0.912208* 3.850641* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB 6.289459* 251.6930* 2.383606* 1.485551* 3.967769* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIP -5.047882* -228.8008* -0.964421*** -1.771416* -1.353391* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIT -6.520772* -251.5957* -1.413548** -1.509445* -1.989552* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIT 0.400515* 2.979740* 1.589169* 0.758138* 2.534213* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIP -0.387562 1.242165* 1.236076*** -0.018188* 1.972425* 
R-squared -0.000737 0.417460 0.021399 0.479625 0.630154 
Adjusted R-squared -0.008596 0.412808 0.011868 0.475387 0.627083 
S.E. of regression 23.23597 642.3726 1.495081 0.824739 2.361776 
Log likelihood -3557.283 -3860.173 -1454.644 -1112.485 -1670.903 
Durbin-Watson stat N.A 0.005633 1.562399 0.076425 0.131337 
 
Table-17 
Variable REER SD SD90 SK KU 
Float 80.02396* 33.51877* 32.76142* 0.374941* 1.334841* 
CBA 79.64828* 35.89059* 35.15368* 0.337111* 1.977781* 
Sliding Peg 80.77218* 37.76242* 37.42650* -0.309685* 2.236742* 
Hard Peg 68.79865* 34.31548* 34.47823* 0.427020* 1.967943* 
Narrow Money Target 14.19291* -10.02156* -8.752268* -0.037720 1.258814* 
Broad Money Target -3.056223* -5.398044* -5.640809* -0.218934* 0.324715* 
Inflation Target 42.77939* 10.44580* 9.344042* 0.069850 0.329336*** 
Total CB Independence -16.16578* -29.96215* -28.39284* -0.816133* 0.680823* 
Part. CB Independence 23.13586* -25.44605* -24.77379* -0.345303* 0.011268 
R-squared 0.971057 0.651018 0.674584 0.524455 0.609794 
Adjusted R-squared 0.970824 0.648181 0.671682 0.520517 0.606504 
S.E. of regression 25.24861 6.145289 5.861132 0.558917 1.175232 
Log likelihood -4198.054 -2950.188 -2647.933 -577.2635 -1102.603 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.036291 0.013896 0.007666 0.323402 0.365581 
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Table-18 
Variable REER SD SD90 SK KU 
FOREXCBA*CBIT 26.11717* 2.851488* 3.232295* -0.598484* 2.740091* 
FOREXCBA*CBIP 129.8589* 12.83982* 12.93805* 0.227177* 1.920826* 
FOREXSPEG*CBIP 102.8518* 11.51434* 11.40898* -0.688081* 2.298790* 
FOREXHPEG*CBIP 92.24942* 7.988244* 8.060075* -0.043384* 2.104903* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMN 92.89456* 21.48457* 21.92852* 0.359789* 2.812302* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB 73.68000* 33.23715* 32.57126* 0.239902* 1.982612* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIP 23.49595* -32.43106* -31.94173* -0.468448* -1.168942** 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIT 114.0137* 13.83208* 13.67100* -0.258792* 2.088938* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIP 125.5075* 21.59302* 21.26855* -0.731560* 2.754349* 
R-squared 0.972010 0.869073 0.884940 0.536404 0.745447 
Adjusted R-squared 0.971784 0.868009 0.883914 0.532564 0.743301 
S.E. of regression 25.58107 5.945282 5.789350 0.545697 1.189385 
Log likelihood -4141.680 -2761.964 -2444.454 -522.7209 -1045.295 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.037002 0.063260 0.032452 0.345250 0.388068 
 
Table-19 
Variable CPI SD SD90 SK KU 
Float 12.17501* 9.730891* 1.848778* 1.422666* 7.971422* 
CBA 10.73574* 11.93938* 1.679837* 1.368783* 7.143723* 
Sliding Peg 11.68403* 8.191490* 1.774339* 0.848345* 3.475741* 
Hard Peg 11.89220* 8.322232* 1.825639* 0.296561* -0.685466 
Narrow Money Target -7.794875* 0.696416 -0.545909*** 0.847067* 0.584952 
Broad Money Target -1.077271* -2.967084* -0.298976* -0.699543* -4.878856* 
Inflation Target -2.466911* -10.14395* -0.578379* -1.586891* -12.06696* 
Total CB Independence -9.230233* 2.548851* -1.021625* 3.429519* 21.05508* 
Part. CB Independence -9.986725* -4.183798* -1.213791* 1.470369* 7.292437* 
R-squared 0.179060 0.457533 0.021822 0.439657 0.205853 
Adjusted R-squared 0.173413 0.453696 0.013398 0.435615 0.200013 
S.E. of regression 8.810626 5.401374 0.781956 1.238698 9.449891 
Log likelihood -3248.158 -2862.665 -851.2164 -1599.195 -3612.671 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.824007 0.034002 1.381251 0.023445 0.014361 
 
Table-20 
Variable CPI SD SD90 SK KU 
FOREXCBA*CBIT 1.239048* 14.79833* 0.626707* 5.442184* 39.45885* 
FOREXCBA*CBIP 0.978934* 7.872696* 0.557361* 1.946080* 6.067446* 
FOREXSPEG*TARGETMB 10.03726* 7.710270* 2.787804** 0.587658* 1.868655* 
FOREXSPEG*CBIP 1.210535* 6.010050* 0.501547* 3.139050* 14.76983* 
FOREXSPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP -10.60034* -13.26888* -3.019836* -2.558403* -11.80250* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB 0.755516* 8.456572* 0.431677* 3.376557* 16.46454* 
FOREXHPEG*CBIP 2.337980* 4.575204* 0.703293* 1.670544* 6.104064* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP -2.324221* -12.61382* -0.851886* -4.220759* -19.54804* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMN 4.421947* 10.51828* 1.296184* 2.323471* 9.049100* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB 8.834892* 6.333737* 1.816524* 1.062481* 4.037227* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIP -7.731699* -3.856753* -1.493935* 1.670035* 9.036535* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIT -2.134067*** 6.819080* 0.025445 0.219456* -0.192424 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIT 0.471751* 0.679351* 0.230681* 2.489277* 11.51459* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIP 0.542794* 9.178395* 0.236457* 5.574789* 38.50443* 
R-squared 0.032024 0.845457 0.041963 0.835971 0.888463 
Adjusted R-squared 0.021157 0.843673 0.028485 0.834039 0.887124 
S.E. of regression 9.281385 6.368041 0.784983 1.028931 8.057073 
Log likelihood -3320.597 -2723.379 -846.0048 -1299.099 -3231.214 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.779783 0.065896 1.424818 0.076630 0.047232 
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Table-21 
Variable IRR SD SD90 SK KU 
Float 71.64088* 53.88626* 6.369153* 0.730616* 7.152401* 
CBA 37.85398* -20.27452* 4.918616* -0.351358* -0.015645 
Sliding Peg 52.23506* -7.107811 4.915649* -0.017609 5.522034* 
Hard Peg 55.53510* 9.881587 5.347833* -0.757432* -0.350141 
Narrow Money Target -12.73151* -26.82966* -2.631009** -1.393760* 2.500603* 
Broad Money Target -14.62681* -32.93851* -0.487263* 0.161632 -0.695840 
Inflation Target -39.85708* -81.84711* -2.130398* -1.083702*** 3.548996 
Total CB Independence -22.41962* 38.70347* -3.715267* 1.121201* 3.344958* 
Part. CB Independence -24.26082* 58.33692* -4.101792* 1.351586* 4.604476* 
R-squared 0.508586 0.140743 0.068919 0.227248 0.121971 
Adjusted R-squared 0.504953 0.134271 0.060642 0.221316 0.115105 
S.E. of regression 121.0345 120.4315 3.283319 2.262837 15.45691 
Log likelihood -4947.862 -5312.774 -1924.464 -1879.391 -3294.891 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.551308 0.025445 1.029675 0.022941 0.004170 
 
Table-22 
Variable IRR SD SD90 SK KU 
FOREXCBA*CBIT 14.63498* 14.68965* 1.147929* 0.792799* 3.402957* 
FOREXCBA*CBIP 19.62860* 27.22561* 1.284345* 0.844627* 2.938456* 
FOREXSPEG*CBIP 19.67237* 204.8205* 0.627648* 4.616886* 36.85198* 
FOREXSPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP -7.062083* -204.0725* -0.215606* -4.309507* -33.28614* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB 21.74984* 17.83969* 1.622652* 0.705185* 2.582275* 
FOREXHPEG*CBIP 27.65122* 111.6035** 1.458879* 0.594910** 4.409380* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP -36.89168* -128.8008** -2.679490* -1.402606* -4.878680* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMN 58.87908* 23.91154* 3.740872* -0.716244* 10.10281* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB 70.23256* 13.53945* 2.481267* -0.092190 1.129831* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIP -51.63251* 76.95268* -0.770887* 2.662784* 9.035380* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIT -2.256854*** -7.964224* N.A. -0.134858 0.554169* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIT 9.341161* 1.481739* 0.489657* -0.493940* 4.016702* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIP 19.75966* 386.9713* 0.417944* 11.42956* 134.5204* 
R-squared 0.687731 0.763898 -0.002442 0.429932 0.603661 
Adjusted R-squared 0.684255 0.761220 -0.014735 0.423341 0.598994 
S.E. of regression 126.2565 157.9192 3.369196 2.156527 15.99103 
Log likelihood -4857.718 -4723.025 -1942.019 -1801.335 -3024.607 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.504094 0.035708 -0.002442 0.047038 0.040031 
 
Table-23 
Variable UM SD SD90 SK KU 
Float 8.696509* 1.700678* 0.260386* -0.081784 0.821346* 
CBA 4.824970* 1.719466* 0.272180* 0.232455* 0.853753* 
Sliding Peg 6.763825* 2.383334* 0.259747* -0.570025* 2.136766* 
Hard Peg 2.972597* 1.371540* 0.226278* 0.237380* 0.827233* 
Narrow Money Target 1.433481* 0.880947* -0.020119 -0.757306* 2.420088* 
Broad Money Target -0.619404*** -0.538350* -0.044927* -0.267721* 1.252341* 
Inflation Target -2.856757* -0.021563 -0.014412 1.574941* 0.435331** 
Total CB Independence 5.201489* 0.405571* -0.092473* -0.928990* 2.264513* 
Part. CB Independence 5.532783* 0.152357 -0.077782** -0.580065* 1.486688* 
R-squared 0.876001 0.456459 0.009968 0.576237 0.729455 
Adjusted R-squared 0.875075 0.452298 0.001265 0.572923 0.727299 
S.E. of regression 3.226972 0.737153 0.181471 0.516320 1.118301 
Log likelihood -2672.669 -1047.160 388.3832 -682.4828 -1381.494 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.022667 0.009907 1.561088 0.054086 0.037190 
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Table-24 
Variable UM SD SD90 SK KU 
FOREXCBA*CBIT 11.38538* 2.390549* 0.179080* -0.785275* 3.256533* 
FOREXCBA*CBIP 7.407059* 1.440467* 0.202311* 0.025439 2.309550* 
FOREXSPEG*CBIP 12.01768* 2.460845* 0.169051* -1.013499* 3.667441* 
FOREXSPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP 0.210171 0.133704 -0.008260 -0.352997* 1.257301* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB 7.595349* 1.196279* 0.089995* -0.984235* 4.506374* 
FOREXHPEG*CBIP 10.40279* 2.293890* 0.281519* -0.365876* 2.027977* 
FOREXHPEG*TARGETMB*CBIP -14.91030* -2.787701* -0.291057* 0.959398* -2.952365* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMN 10.26329* 2.602572* 0.240314* -0.831895* 3.242304* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB 8.632432* 1.878383* 0.221885* -0.374079* 2.024261* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIP 5.317317* -0.524107* -0.083659* -0.640738* 1.811199* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETMB*CBIT -3.761004* -1.056180* -0.100667* 0.084404 -0.321601* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIT 7.592766* 1.592673* 0.153010* 0.990334* 3.663128* 
FOREXFLOAT*TARGETIT*CBIP 14.60000* 2.410960* 0.160706* -0.476515* 2.589245* 
R-squared 0.806354 0.542427 0.027938 0.623953 0.760636 
Adjusted R-squared 0.804176 0.537152 0.015063 0.619525 0.757763 
S.E. of regression 2.634054 0.664091 0.182348 0.460920 1.101492 
Log likelihood -2467.538 -904.9352 393.3456 -575.0933 -1372.497 
Durbin-Watson stat 0.032640 0.014289 1.573251 0.048619 0.034414 
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